Food Deprivation: A Basis for Refugee Status? by Hathaway, James C.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
2014
Food Deprivation: A Basis for Refugee Status?
James C. Hathaway
University of Michigan Law School, jch@umich.edu
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1076
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Food and Drug Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Immigration Law
Commons, and the Social Welfare Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hathaway, James C. "Food Deprivation: A Basis for Refugee Status?" Soc. Res. 81, no. 2 (2014): 327-39.
social research Vol. 81 : No. 2 : Summer 2014327
James C. Hathaway 
Food Deprivation: A Basis 
for Refugee Status?
IT IS COMMONPLACE TO SPEAK OF THOSE IN FLIGHT FROM FAMINE, OR OTHERWISE 
migrating in search of food, as “refugees.” Over the past decade alone, 
millions of persons have abandoned their homes in countries such 
as North Korea, Sudan, Ethiopia, Congo, and Somalia, hoping that 
by moving they could find the nourishment needed to survive. In a 
colloquial sense, these people are refugees: they are on the move not 
by choice, but rather because their own desperation compels them to 
pursue a survival strategy away from the desperation confronting their 
home communities.
In legal terms, however, refugee status is defined in a signifi-
cantly more constrained way. The key standard, set by the United Na-
tions Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951,1 as supple-
mented by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees of 1967,2 
limits refugee status to a person who 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular so-
cial group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country. . . (Con-
vention, supra n.1, at Art. 1([A][2]).
As interpreted, this definition sets five substantive hurdles: departure 
from one’s own country; the existence of a forward-looking risk; serious 
human rights risk; a causal connection between risk and at least one 
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of the five enumerated forms of civil or political status; and failure of 
the home state to remedy the threat. There are also clauses that define 
when refugee status comes to an end (for example, when protection is 
restored in the home state) and when it must not be recognized due to 
undeservingness (for example, in the case of international criminals).
As demanding as this Convention refugee definition clearly is, 
there is a logic to its stringency. Any person who meets this definition 
in fact—whether or not she has undergone a formal process of status 
assessment—is entitled to arrive without authorization in any of the 
nearly 150 countries that are parties to the Convention (Convention, 
supra n.1, at Art. 31[1]). Until and unless fairly determined by the host 
country not to be a refugee, she cannot be returned directly or indi-
rectly to her home state for the duration of the risk. And perhaps most 
important of all, she is entitled to the benefit of a truly extraordinary 
catalog of internationally guaranteed rights that enable her to live in 
dignity while in exile: civil rights, socioeconomic rights, and rights that 
enable pursuit of a solution to her refugeehood (see Hathaway 2005).
In short, while the broad, colloquial definition of a refugee may 
engender empathy or even charity, the narrower legal definition of a 
refugee is a source of entitlement. Whereas a common-sense refugee 
pulls at our heartstrings, a Convention refugee is a rights-bearer.
The question addressed here is whether persons in flight from 
famine or otherwise migrating in search of food may claim the ben-
efit of this more constrained but dramatically more empowering legal 
form of refugee status. Or are they outside that definition, such that 
they must simply hope that others will come to their aid?
The most obvious barrier to Convention refugee status is the 
need to have left one’s own country as a condition precedent to refu-
gee status. While the ethicality of this constraint has been debated in 
the refugee studies literature,3 its standing in international law is not 
open to question. As determined by Lord Justice Simon Brown in the 
English Court of Appeal, in the context of the claim by a Roma citizen 
of the Czech Republic still in the Prague Airport to be entitled to refu-
gee rights,
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in an ideal world there would no doubt be provision for 
states to facilitate the escape of persecuted minorities. . . .  
I am satisfied, however, that on no view of the 1951 Conven-
tion is this within its scope (R. European Roma Rights Centre 
and Others v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport, [2003] EWXA 
Civ 666 [Eng. CA, May 20, 2003], at paras. 37, 43; approved 
in this regard by the House of Lords in R. v. Immigration Of-
ficer at Prague Airport et al, ex parte Roma Rights Centre et al, 
[2004] UKHL 55 [UK HL, Dec. 9, 2004], at paras. 13–17).
So-called internally displaced persons (IDPs) are, of course, entitled 
to claim the same general human rights as all persons inside their own 
country.4 In Africa, a regional convention moreover expands the scope of 
human rights to which IDPs are entitled.5 But the rights set by the Refu-
gee Convention are specifically designed to counter the disadvantages of 
involuntary alienage, not to compensate for involuntary movement as 
such. It thus makes sense that refugee rights, conceived as they are to 
allow someone forced to live in a foreign country to secure a measure of 
enfranchisement in that foreign state, have been limited to such at-risk 
persons who are in fact outside their own country.
For those victims of famine or other forms of food deprivation 
who do manage to cross a border, there are two main conceptual chal-
lenges to securing Convention refugee status. First, is the risk faced 
one that is fairly defined as a risk of “being persecuted”? And second, 
even if it is a persecutory harm, when can it be said that the risk faced 
is “for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion”?
As classically understood, the 1951 Convention refugee defini-
tion would likely not be terribly sympathetic to the claims of persons 
in flight from famine or food deprivation. 
First, as the still in force Handbook issued by the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1979 suggests, “[t]here 
is no universally accepted definition of ‘persecution,’ and various at-
tempts to formulate such a definition have met with little success” 
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(para. 51).6 States often applied a subjective lens to assess whether a 
given risk rose to the level of persecutory harm, and in practice were 
more predisposed to accept claims of risk to physical security or ba-
sic civil rights than those grounded in threats to socioeconomic well-
being—a position clearly at odds with recognizing absence of food as 
sufficient to establish refugee status.
Second, the “for reasons of” or “nexus” clause was often inter-
preted by states to require some evidence of particularized intention 
on the part of the persecutor grounded in the race, religion, national-
ity, social group, or political opinion of the victim.7 This approach set 
a very challenging evidentiary hurdle given the unlikelihood of the 
persecutor clearly announcing his motives. But at least as important, it 
restricted refugee status to those whose intentional victimization could 
be ascribed to one of the Convention grounds, thus failing to recognize 
refugee status in the case of those who, within a situation of general-
ized risk such as famine, did not benefit from state protection because 
of their race, religion, or other protected ground. In other words, if a 
person without food could say “only” that the government had failed 
to assist her because she was a member of a minority group or because 
she was perceived to be opposed to the government, she would not be 
recognized as a refugee under international law.
The good news is that over the course of the past two decades 
there has been a major judge-led challenge to many traditional ways 
of thinking about the refugee definition—including both the meaning 
of “being persecuted” and the purport of the “for reasons of” clause 
(Hathaway 2003). Since there is sadly no single international author-
ity charged with issuing definitive interpretations of refugee law8—as 
there is, for example, under nearly every other UN human rights trea-
ty—it has been left largely to national judges interpreting domestic 
laws incorporating the UN refugee definition to fill the void. These 
decisionmakers have often engaged in a “transnational judicial con-
versation” (Helfer and Slaughter 1997, 371–372) in which they have 
sought to update the meaning of the Convention refugee definition 
Food Deprivation: A Basis for Refugee Status?  331
in a way that brings some degree of coherence to the international 
protection regime as a whole. In a seminal decision, the House of Lords 
determined that
the Refugee Convention must be given an independent 
meaning. . . without taking color from distinctive features 
of the legal system of any individual contracting state. In 
principle, there can only be one true interpretation of a 
treaty. . . .
In practice it is left to national courts, faced with the mate-
rial disagreement on an issue of interpretation, to resolve 
it. But in doing so, it must search, untrammeled by notions 
of its national legal culture, for the true autonomous and 
international meaning of the treaty (R. v. Secretary of State, ex 
parte Adan, [2001] 2 AC 477 at 516–17).
This search for autonomous and international meaning has led courts 
carefully to consider, and often to adopt, the reasoning of their coun-
terparts engaged in refugee status assessment in other jurisdictions. As 
recognized by Justice Allsop in a powerful dissenting opinion in the Full 
Federal Court of Australia,
[c]onsidered decisions of foreign courts, in particular ap-
pellate decisions, should be treated as persuasive in order 
to strive for uniformity of interpretation of international 
conventions. . . . It is desirable that obligations of the host 
states under an instrument such as the [Refugee] Conven-
tion be consistently interpreted in order that there be uni-
formity of approach not only as to host state rights and 
obligations, but also as to the derivative legal position of 
refugees thereunder (NBGM v. Minister for Immigration [2006] 
150 FCR 2006 at para. 158).
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Though this judicial drive to achieve principled, common ground was 
traditionally most advanced in states of the common law (English law-
based) tradition, the civil law states of the European Union are now 
increasingly looking to common, international standards as well (see 
Lambert 2009). And while the United States remains the least engaged of 
common law countries on this front, both administrative guidelines and 
some judicial decisions have now championed a common, international-
ist approach to understanding the Convention refugee definition (see 
Anker 2011, 176).
This judicial renovation of refugee law has opened the doors to a 
more principled and thoughtful understanding of refugee law in ways 
that have direct relevance to the claims of those in flight from famine 
or other forms of food deprivation. First, there is now general agree-
ment that core norms of international human rights law—the body 
of law designed by states to define impermissible harms—should be 
the principled point of reference for understanding how to identify a 
risk of being persecuted. Pioneered by courts in Canada and the United 
Kingdom (see in particular Ward v. Canada: [1993] 2 SCR 689 at 733; and 
Horvath v. Secretary of State [2001] 1 AC 489 at 495), the link between hu-
man rights law and persecutory harm in refugee law is now formally 
binding on all states of the European Union as well (Council Directive 
2011/95/EU, OJ L 337/9 [“Qualification Directive”], at Art. 9). While less 
well developed in the United States, even there a leading court deter-
mined that “[w]hether the treatment feared by a claimant violates rec-
ognized standards of basic human rights can determine whether perse-
cution exists” (Stenaj v. Gonzalez [2007] 227 F.3d 429 at paras. 12–14; see 
also Abay v. Ashcroft [2008] 368 F.3d 634 at 638–639). A similar position 
is taken in US guidelines on the adjudication of gender-specific claims 
to refugee status (Department of Homeland Security 2009, 21).
In implementing this link between “being persecuted” and in-
ternational human rights law, refugee law has increasingly taken on 
board the view that all human rights are properly understood to be 
equal and indivisible (Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 
UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23 [June 12, 1993], at para. 5; this declaration was 
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endorsed by 171 states). Specifically, it is not the case that a risk to civil 
and political rights can be said to be “serious harm,” but a risk to socio-
economic rights—also codified in international law, and of equal legal 
authority—cannot. Thus, interpretation of “serious harm” for refugee 
law purposes should take account of risks to, inter alia, the interna-
tionally guaranteed right to food, a critical aspect of the right to an 
adequate standard of living set by the Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for him-
self and his family, including adequate food, clothing, and 
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living con-
ditions (International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights, GA Res. 2200A (XXI), adopted December 16, 
1966; entered into force Jan. 3, 1976, henceforth “Economic 
Covenant,” at Art. 11) [emphasis added]. 
To be clear, the existence of this right does not mean that every 
person departing his country in search of food is a refugee. For ex-
ample, a US court sensibly determined that a Salvadoran denied access 
to the government’s discounted food regime did not face the risk of a 
persecutory harm: while the situation reduced his food options, those 
limits did not rise to the level of gravity required to be persecution (Sa-
ballo Cortez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service [1984] 761 F.2d 1259 
at 1264). On the other hand, it has been recognized that “denial of fam-
ine relief in anti-government areas” may constitute persecution (Chan 
v. Canada [1992] 42 ACWS 3d 259); that the “taking of harvests of those 
perceived as ‘enemies,’ rather than those perceived as allies” might 
found a claim to be at risk of persecution (Hagi-Mohammed v. Minister 
for Immigration [2001] FCA 1156 at para. 7); and that “discriminatory 
exclusion from access to food is capable itself of constituting persecu-
tion” (RN [Returnees] Zimbabwe CG, UKAIT 00083 [2008] UKAIT 00083 at 
para. 249). In the latter decision, which took up the issue of the use of 
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food as a weapon, the United Kingdom’s Immigration Appeal Tribunal 
recognized refugee status on the grounds that
the government of Zimbabwe has used its control of the dis-
tribution of food aid as a political tool to the disadvantage of 
those thought to be potential supporters of the MDC. This 
discriminatory deprivation of food to perceived opponents, 
taken together with the disruption of the efforts of NGOs 
to distribute food by means of the ban introduced in June 
2008, amounts to persecution of those deprived of access to 
this essential support (para. 250).
Even in the United States, there is clear evidence of an openness to recog-
nizing food-based persecution, with the Board of Immigration Appeals 
having determined that an applicant 
need not demonstrate a total deprivation of livelihood or 
a total withdrawal of all economic opportunity in order 
to demonstrate harm amounting to persecution. . . . Gov-
ernment sanctions that reduce an applicant to an impov-
erished existence may amount to persecution even if the 
victim retains the ability to afford the bare essentials of life 
(In re TZ (2007) 251 I&N Dec. 163 at 172–3).
Assuming, then, that food deprivation will, at least in extreme cases, 
be sufficiently serious to qualify as a form of persecution, what of the 
second relevant challenge—showing that the risk is “for reasons of” 
one of the five Convention grounds? This is, of course, most commonly 
a concern where famine or food deprivation seems to be a generalized 
problem in the place of origin. The problem here has traditionally been 
the view—sadly still generally taken in the United States—that there 
must be a nexus between a Convention ground and the intentions of the 
persecutor —in other words, did the person or organization want to starve 
the applicant because she is black, a woman, a political opponent? Absent 
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evidence of such narrowly framed persecutory intent, a refugee claim 
assessed under this rubric would fail.
Yet here too there has been quite extraordinary progress in at 
least some jurisdictions. Building on the judicial recognition that the 
causal connection required by international law is not actually to “per-
secution” (understood as the direct act) but rather to “being persecut-
ed” (that is, the predicament of being at risk) (Minister for Immigration v. 
Kord [2002] 125 FCR 68 at para. 2; see also Minister for Immigration v. Kha-
war [2002] 210 CLR 1 at para. 108), courts have increasingly determined 
that the nexus requirement can be satisfied in either of two ways. First, 
the nexus requirement is met in the classical situation in which the 
persecutor is indeed motivated to harm by a Convention factor—clear-
ly that intention, based for example on nationality or religion, explains 
why the applicant is in trouble (see text supra, at fn.7). But modern ju-
risprudence recognizes that this is not the only way such a connection 
could be established. Even if the risk of food deprivation is itself gen-
eralized, some people might nonetheless be at risk for a Convention 
reason if the state fails to protect her (individually, or as part of a group) 
for a Convention reason (see, for example, Horvath v. Secretary of State 
[2001] 1 AC 489 at 497–8). In other words, a person from whom protec-
tion is withheld for a Convention reason is as much in the predicament 
of “being persecuted” for a Convention reason as is the person initially 
targeted for harm for a Convention reason.
The logic of this position was eloquently explained in a seminal 
decision of the House of Lords:
[S]uppose the Nazi government . . . did not actively organize 
violence against Jews, but pursued a policy of not giving 
any protection to Jews subjected to violence by neighbors. 
A Jewish shopkeeper is attacked by a gang organized by an 
Aryan competitor. . . . The competitor and his gang are mo-
tivated by business rivalry and the desire to settle old per-
sonal scores. . . .
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Is he being persecuted on ground of race? . . . [I]n my opin-
ion, he is. An essential element in the persecution, the fail-
ure by the authorities to provide protection, is based upon 
race. It is true that one answer to the question “why was he 
attacked?” would be “because a competitor wanted to drive 
him out of business.” But another answer, and in my view 
the right answer in the context of the Convention, would 
be “he was attacked by a competitor who knew he would 
receive no protection because he was a Jew” (R. v. Immigra-
tion Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah [1999] 2 AC 629 at 653–4).
This evolution in thinking about the “for reasons of” require-
ment is important for those fleeing food deprivation. There will, of 
course, be cases like the Zimbabwean situation noted above, in which 
a government seeks to punish perceived opponents by means of a tar-
geted policy of food deprivation. But perhaps more commonly, there 
will be cases in which there is no evidence of an active, discriminatory 
intention to withhold food, but rather only of a government’s failure to 
respond to generalized famine or other food deprivation on a nondis-
criminatory basis. While such cases would fall outside the classical ap-
proach to the nexus clause—after all, the risk of starvation arose from 
generalized, not discriminatory, causes—the bifurcated approach pro-
vides a second means to satisfy this requirement by recognizing that a 
discriminatory failure to remedy a risk is equally the basis for refugee 
status. Because the link to a “failure” of state protection is all that 
must be shown under the bifurcated approach, it is sufficient to show 
that the government simply could not be bothered to protect a portion 
of the at-risk group—reasoning, for example, that because they are 
“only” women or indigenous persons they were not worthy of an ex-
penditure of government resources. In such circumstances, the failure 
of protection is causally connected to a Convention ground and refugee 
status should be recognized.
These critical developments—the anchoring of “being perse-
cuted” analysis in international human rights law, including socio-
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economic rights such as the right to food; and the broadening of our 
understanding of the “for reasons of” clause to include not only those 
targeted for a Convention ground, but also those failed by their state 
for such a reason—do not, of course, mean that all victims of famine or 
food deprivation able to cross an international border are Convention 
refugees. There will still be cases where the nature of the food depriva-
tion cannot honestly be said to infringe the right to an adequate stan-
dard of living, thus falling outside the scope of “serious harm” relevant 
to a finding that a risk rises to the level of “being persecuted.” And 
even more commonly, there will be situations in which there is not 
only no intention to deprive a person of food for a Convention reason, 
but where not even the failure of the home state to respond to that risk 
can be seen as discriminatory. While the African regional norm may 
provide access to refugee status in even such cases,9 it remains the case 
that the international refugee definition binding on most states will 
not require recognition of refugee status.
But contemporary understandings of refugee status nonetheless 
enfranchise a not insignificant number of persons compelled to flight 
across a border by reason of food scarcity. There is today a solid basis to 
claim Convention refugee status at least where serious denial of food 
results from using food as a weapon or otherwise actively seeking to 
punish or harm people—for example, because of their race or religion; 
as well as where a generalized and serious insufficiency of food is met 
with a discriminatory response by the state based on, for example, sex 
or political views. With Convention status comes Convention rights, 
and with Convention rights comes the empowerment to rebuild one’s 
life in security, and with dignity.
NOTES
1. Adopted July 28, 1951, entered into force April 22, 1954, UNTS 137 
(“Refugee Convention” or “Convention”).
2. Adopted January 31, 1967, entered into force October 4, 1967, 606 
UNTS 267 (referred to herein as “Refugee Protocol” or “Protocol”).
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3. See in particular the Symposium in the 2007 Journal of Refugee Studies 
(20: 349 ff.), containing responses by Roberta Cohen, Howard Adelman/
Susan McGrath, and Josh DeWind to J. Hathaway, “Forced Migration 
Studies: Could We Agree Just to ‘Date’?”
4. See United Nations “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,” 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, Feb. 11, 1998.
5. African Union Convention on the Protection and Assistance of 
Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, adopted October 26, 2009, 
entered into force December 6, 2012. Regrettably, the treaty provides 
little by way of meaningful enforcement of the obligations formally 
assumed.
6. Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (UN 
Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.3; henceforth Handbook); reissued in 2011.
7. In the United States, the leading precedent of Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Elias Zacarias (1992) 502 US 478 (USSC, Jan. 22, 
1992) takes this position. See also Ram v. Minister of Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs (1995) 30 ALR 213 (Aus. FFC, June 9, 2000 at 12), reflecting 
the traditional (though since discredited) Australian approach.
8. States are required to “cooperate” with UNHCR in its institutional role 
of “supervising the application” of the Convention: Convention, supra 
n.1, at Art. 35. The agency, however, has no authority to mandate any 
particular interpretation of the Convention refugee definition. See 
Hathaway (2013).
9. The Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems 
in Africa, UNTS 14691, entered into force June 20, 1974, at Art. 1(2), 
which extends refugee status to inter alia persons forced to f lee all 
or part of their country of origin due to “events seriously disturbing 
public order,” and which leaves open the possibility that the reason 
for the risk faced may be indeterminate.
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